ABSTRACT
The following article depicts bank debt recovery in Poland as a determinant of information asymmetry. Information asymmetry is one of a few market failures and it means an unequal access to information for various subjects, also in relations between the bank and the customer. Drawing on the model of Helmut Bester, debt recoveries have been analyzed on the example of bank consumer credits in Poland. The indicator based on such values constitutes an effective measure of information advantage for the borrower. Data on unpaid consumer credits illustrate the information asymmetry on the market. The main hypothesis assumes that data about unpaid consumer credits illustrate the level of information asymmetry on the market- the bigger information asymmetry is, the bigger the recovery.
References
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G. Akerlof, The Market for ‘Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84 (1970) 488.
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H. Bester, Screening vs. rationing in credit markets with imperfect information, American Economic Review 75(4) (1985) 850-855.
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J. Colquitt, Credit Risk Management: How to Avoid Lending Disasters and Maximize Earnings, The McGraw Hill Companies, New York 2007, p. 232.
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